Martyrs or traitors. A choice the West must be careful not to force on the people of the Middle East.
How can an Arab leader be friend with the Western nations without being labeled as a traitor by the rest of the Arab World? Is it possible?
Is the radical freedom fighter image selling more than the moderate one among Arabs?
Will the Arab World support Fatah? Or will they perceive Fatah as traitors dealing with "the enemy" a.k.a. the West?Egypt's president, Anwar Sadat, was called a traitor for making his courageous peace with Israel in 1979 (and assassinated by jihadists two years later). Arafat was called a traitor after shaking hands with an Israeli prime minister on the White House lawn. In Lebanon right now the Hizbullah movement calls the beleaguered government of Fouad Siniora traitorous because it is propped up by France and America. Iraq's prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, needs to keep his distance from America to fend off accusations that he is a puppet of the occupation. And, of course, the assumption of many Muslims that a pro-American leader must in some way be a traitor to the cause extends beyond the Arab world: in Pakistan and Afghanistan Presidents Musharraf and Karzai have constantly to face down the cry that by allying with the superpower they have sold out their countries—or, worse, their religion.
America's allies cannot stop the martyrs from calling them traitors. America has made itself deeply unpopular in the Islamic world by invading Iraq and standing by Israel. This is bound to taint any Muslim leader who looks as if he owes his position to American military or economic power. But guilt by association is only one half of the reason for the growing popularity of the martyrs and the spreading idea that America's allies must be traitors. The other half is that, by comparison with the traitors, the martyrs look clean.
The martyrs have another selling point. They are still “resisting”. During the Lebanon war last summer Hizbullah won millions of admirers for breaking the spell of Israeli invincibility. Hamas claimed credit for forcing Israel to evacuate its settlers and soldiers from the Gaza Strip two years ago. Salam Fayyad, the new Palestinian prime minister installed by Mr Abbas, is a decent man. But he is a former World Bank employee in a suit. The Hamas fighter with a bandanna and machinegun makes much better box office.
After Fatah's debacle in Gaza, Mr Bush and Mr Olmert see an opportunity to prove via a Hamas-free government in the West Bank that moderation pays. But it is not enough for Israel and America to release the economic help they withheld from the Palestinians when Hamas was still formally in charge. For the Palestinians' principal grievance is not economic. What they chiefly want is an end to Israel's occupation of the West Bank as well as Gaza so that they can enjoy an independent national existence in both places. And in this respect the West Bank is a tougher problem than Gaza, because it remains speckled by Israeli settlements and throttled by checkpoints.
What America must now prove is that its moderate Arab allies, far from being traitors, can actually deliver desirable results. In the case of Palestine, Mr Abbas and his new prime minister have to show not only that they can govern cleanly but also that they can get Israel to start dismantling outposts and leaving the West Bank. This, as it happens, is not something martyrs can do: Hamas's rockets just make the Israelis less willing to take risks. But to offer the moderates money and no visible progress towards statehood is to treat them with contempt—and to invite Arabs everywhere to do the same.
How can an Arab leader be friend with the Western nations without being labeled as a traitor by the rest of the Arab World? Is it possible?
Is the radical freedom fighter image selling more than the moderate one among Arabs?