KEN-JENNINGS
I am all that is MOD!
+2,992|7074|949

http://www.technewsworld.com/story/58572.html

For instance, the testers analyzing the Sequoia e-voting machine were able to gain physical access to the system by removing screws to bypass locks. The testers also discovered numerous ways to overwrite the firmware of the Sequoia Edge system -- for example, using malformed font files or doctored update cartridges.

Testers were also able to exploit vulnerabilities in Diebold's Windows  operating system and take security-related actions that the server did not record in its audit logs. Thus, testers were able to manipulate several components networked to the server, including loading wireless drivers onto the server that could then be used to access a wireless device plugged surreptitiously into the back of the server.

Diebold's physical security was also lacking, the researchers found. Testers were able to bypass the physical controls on the optical scanner, for example.

The testers also found numerous ways to overwrite Diebold's firmware. Attacks could change vote totals, among other things. For instance, the testers were able to escalate privileges from those of a voter to those of a poll worker or central count administrator, enabling them to reset an election, issue unauthorized voter cards and close polls.

The testers did not test the Windows systems on which the Hart election management software was installed because Hart does not configure the operating system or provide a default configuration, notes the report.

Rather, Hart software security settings provide a restricted, Hart-defined environment that the testers were able to bypass, which allowed them to run the Hart software in a standard Windows environment.

They also found an undisclosed account on the Hart software that an attacker who penetrated the host operating system could exploit to gain unauthorized access to the Hart election management database.

The testers were able to overwrite the firmware and access menus that should have been locked with passwords. Other attacks allowed the team to alter vote totals; these attacks used ordinary objects. The team was also able to develop a device that caused Hart's system to authorize access codes without poll worker intervention
I'll find the company rebuttals in a little...
topal63
. . .
+533|7160
Computer Programmer testifies that Tom Feeney (Speaker of the House of Florida at the time, currently a US Representative) tried to pay him to rig election vote counts. 2004


A Demonstration of how a voting machine can be hacked.
A vote stealing virus is placed on a Diebold AccuVote touch-screen voting machine by Computer Scientists at Princeton University.

Last edited by topal63 (2007-07-31 18:34:23)

KEN-JENNINGS
I am all that is MOD!
+2,992|7074|949

More - From Florida!?
http://www.computerworld.com/action/art … rc=hm_list

Optical scan voting devices slated to be used in presidential primary elections in Florida next year are significantly flawed and could compromise the outcome of the contest, according to a report released yesterday by Secretary of State Kurt Browning
topal63
. . .
+533|7160

KEN-JENNINGS wrote:

More - From Florida!?
http://www.computerworld.com/action/art … rc=hm_list

Optical scan voting devices slated to be used in presidential primary elections in Florida next year are significantly flawed and could compromise the outcome of the contest, according to a report released yesterday by Secretary of State Kurt Browning
Gotta love Floor-ee-DUH!

From the article:
For example, it said, Diebold's Accuvote OS optical scan machine is vulnerable to vote manipulation by illicitly inserting a preprogrammed memory card into a voting terminal. The report said that the card could be coded to flip votes from one candidate to another without detection.
This is basically the same thing demonstrated by the Princeton hack (virus).

Last edited by topal63 (2007-08-01 13:11:24)

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